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“… For the classical theory has 
been accustomed to rest the 
supposedly self-adjusting character 
of the economic  system on an 
assumed fluidity of money –wages; 
and, when there is rigidity, to lay on 
this rigidity the blame of 
maladjustment” 
 
(Keynes, 1936,  p. 257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
   
  The mainstream macroeconomic approach continues to accept, implicitly 
or explicitly, the assumption that flexibility in wages and prices is always able to 
ensure full employment equilibrium1. The argument goes that, should a fall in 
aggregate demand lead to involuntary unemployment, the more rapidly wages and 
prices fall, the faster will be the adjustment towards full employment. As we have 
all read, the income and employment stabilising function works above all through 
Pigou’s “real balance effect” (1943; 1947; 1949). 
                   And yet both Keynes (1923; 1931; 1936) and Kalecki (1937; 1944; 
1966) denied the existence of self-balancing endogenous mechanisms able to 
stabilise the economic system, and opened the way to an alternative approach 
seeking to demonstrate that wage and price flexibility can be destabilising. In fact 
in the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), in one set of writings which took place in 
1931-33 and in the General Theory (1936: Ch. XIX), Keynes questioned the 
viability of flexible wages and prices to restore full employment. On the other hand, 
in a comment on Pigou (1944) and in Studies in the Theory of Business Cycles 
(1966), Kalecki argued that falling prices will not necessarily stimulate an increase 
in aggregate demand when firms and households have extensive debt commitments. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Mankiw, 1990. 
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Our object in this paper is to review these contributions with the aim of discussing 
alternative approaches in the spirit of post-keynesian and showing their relevance to 
an essentially critical appraisal of the mainstream analysis. 
The paper is organised thus: in section 1 we look at the traditional theory and the 
“Pigou effect”;  in sections 2 and 3 we analyse the contributions by Keynes and 
Kalecki respectively on the destabilising role of wage and price flexibility; in 
section 4 we consider the possible implications of the alternative approach to be 
found in the literature; in section 5, we draw our conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
1.  Stabilizing flexibility and the “Pigou effect” 
 
   
The mainstream approach sees price flexibility as the means by which the 
market economy is always able to guarantee that full utilisation of all resources 
can be achieved. For example, if an excess of supply comes on the labour market, 
then monetary wages will have to drop, and the marginal cost will fall below the 
marginal revenue, bringing about an increase in production and a fall in the level 
of prices. The effect of resources being under-utilised will be to generate in the 
aggregate a drive towards deflation in the prices of goods and thus to stimulate 
demand in such a way that full employment be achieved. The adjustment comes 
about automatically as the prices of goods and factors are flexible.  
  Thus, in terms of the traditional AD-AS model, if the economic system 
as a whole were to meet with involuntary unemployment, caused by a fall in 
aggregate demand, then wage and price flexibility would bring about adjustment 
both on the supply side (downward shift in AS) and on the aggregate demand side 
(movement along the AD). The stabilizing role that deflation plays on aggregate 
demand, as we learn, is accomplished essentially along two channels: a) the so-
called “Keynes effect”2 and b) the “Pigou effect” or “real balance effect”. In the 
former case the fall in the general level of prices produces an increase in the 
supply of money in real terms and so leads to a fall in the interest rate, which in 
                                                 
2 Cf. Haberler, 1958, p. 491 
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turn should favour an increase in investments and the generation of expansive 
effects. However, there is also a “liquidity trap” at work, which could 
compromise the regular functioning of this adjustment mechanism. Thus, as we 
well know, the  stabilization process makes use of the ”real balance effect” by 
virtue of which price deflation, generating an increase in wealth in real terms, 
favours the expansion of aggregate consumption, and thus of income and 
employment.  
  In terms of the theoretical background, the emphasis placed on the 
“Pigou effect” as relevant to macroeconomic analysis is due above all to Don 
Patinkin. In fact, in an article under the ‘unequivocal’  title of “Price Flexibility 
and Full Employment” (1948), making critical comparison between Keynes’s 
analysis (1936) and Pigou’s contribution (1943), Patinkin identifies precisely in 
the absence of the real balance effect from the consumption function the factor 
that had led the author of the General Theory to suppose, erroneously, that there 
were no automatic mechanisms that could favour the attainment of full 
employment (cf. Patinkin, 1948, p. 555). On the other hand, according to Patinkin 
Pigou’s analysis “has demonstrated the automaticity of full employment within 
the framework of the classical static model – the main mechanism by which this 
is brought about being the effect of a price decline on cash balances” (ibid. p. 
555). As this quotation shows, however, Patinkin makes a point of limiting the 
validity of Pigou’s conclusions to the static context3. Indeed, he warns that on 
proceeding from static to dynamic analysis, it immediately becomes crucial to 
consider the role of expectations vis-à-vis future prices, for “It is quite possible 
that the original price decline will lead to the expectation of further declines. Then 
purchasing decisions will be postponed, aggregate demand will fall off, and the 
amount of unemployment increased still more” (ibid. pp. 557-58). Patinkin 
returned to these points and elaborated upon them further in the 1950s, as a result 
growing somewhat sceptical about the effective functioning of the “Pigou effect”, 
to the extent that he concluded that “… only further investigation will tell us 
                                                 
3 That is, only in the case that the fall in wages and prices be not such as to generate expectations of further 
reductions. It is, in fact, only in this case that: “there always exists a sufficiently low price level such that, if 
expected to continue indefinitely, it will generate full employment” (Patinkin, 1948, p. 557). On this argument 
see also Lange (1944). 
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whether a price decline does indeed have a positive net effect on total expenditure 
(Patinkin, 1951, p. 263)4.  
  Nevertheless, despite the reservations stressed by Patinkin (1948; 1951), 
both the authors of the subsequent “Neoclassical Keynesian Synthesis” (Hicks, 
1957 e 1974) and many exponents of the more recent current of New Keynesians5 
(Mankiw, 1986; 1992; Romer, 1993) have continued to argue that only the 
presence of “rigidity” or “stickiness” in wages and/or prices can effectively 
prevent the “Pigou effect” from fully exercising its function as endogenous self-
balancing mechanism. Keynes’s theory would thus prove to remain even today an 
interesting and useful “special case”, valid only inasmuch as there are 
institutional factors or the imperfections of the real world that curb the regular 
functioning of market forces.  
 
 
 
2. Non-stabilizing flexibility: Keynes’s contributions 
 
 
  As announced in the introduction, by referring to certain contributions 
by Keynes and Kalecki we intend to show how both held wage and price 
flexibilities totally unable to perform a stabilising function. As early as the first 
three introductory chapters of the General Theory (1936), as is well known, 
Keynes denies the existence of endogenous adjustment mechanisms able to guide 
the economic system automatically towards full employment income. It is, 
however, above all in chapter XIX, entitled “Changes in money wages”, that the 
Cambridge economist delivers his decisive blow against the “classical” approach, 
on the basis of which the capitalistic economic system is always capable of self-
balancing and reaching full employment equilibrium6. According to Keynes the 
                                                 
4 In the 1951 book these considerations are further clarified and developed (cf. Simonazzi-Vianello (2004)). It 
is, moreover, to be added that Patinkin was also convinced that a policy of wage and price deflation would be 
difficult to implement from the practical viewpoint, and the adjustment due to the real balance effect would 
actually be a very long-term process. 
5 Here, however, distinction must be made between the so-called New Keynesians who took nominal 
rigidities into consideration (e.g. Mankiw 1986,  1992 and Romer,1993), and the New Keynesians who 
analysed the effects of asymmetric information on the financial market (e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993). In 
fact, while the former do not deny that wage and price flexibility can play a stabilising role, the latter, by 
contrast, see pro-cyclic flexibility as destabilising. On this point see the study by Ardeni-Boitani-Delli Gatti-
Gallegati in Messori (1999). 
6 Cf. the epigraph quotation. 
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“classical” economists were mistaken in holding that a reduction in wages 
necessarily leads to an increase in employment since such could be the case if, 
and only if, the reduction were accompanied by unvaried aggregate effective 
demand: “….whilst no one would wish to deny the proposition that a reduction in 
money-wages accompanied by the same aggregate effective demand as before 
will be associated with an increase in employment, the precise question at issue is 
whether the reduction in money-wages will or will not be accompanied by the 
same aggregate effective demand as before measured in money, or, at any rate, by 
an aggregate effective demand which is not reduced in full proportion to the 
reduction in money-wages …” (1936,   p. 259- 260 ).  
  Keynes shows, on the contrary, that wage and price  deflation leads to a 
decline in effective demand and thus to a fall in income and employment. As for 
the effects on the propensity to consume, he remarks: “A reduction of money-
wages will somewhat reduce prices. It will, therefore, involve some redistribution 
of real income (a) from wage-earners to other factors entering into marginal prime 
cost whose remuneration has not been reduced, and (b) from entrepreneurs to 
rentiers to whom a certain income fixed in terms of money has been guaranteed. 
What will be the effect of this redistribution on the propensity to consume for the 
community as a whole? The transfer from wage-earners to other factors is likely 
to diminish the propensity to consume. The effect of the transfer from 
entrepreneurs to rentiers is more open to doubt. But if rentiers represent on the 
whole the richer section of the community and those whose standard of life is 
least flexible, then the effect of this also will be unfavourable. What the net result 
will be on a balance of considerations, we can only guess. Probably it is more 
likely to be adverse than favourable.” (1936, p. 262).  
  The problem of redistributive effects associated with variations in the 
value of money is, as we know, one of the issues already addressed by Keynes in 
the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923). Here, in the chapter entitled “The 
Consequences to Society of Changes in the Value of Money”, he remarks: “Thus a 
change in prices and rewards, as measured in money, generally affects different 
classes unequally, transfers wealth from one to another, bestows affluence here 
and embarrassment there, and redistributes Fortune’s favour so as to frustrate 
design and disappoint expectation” (1923, p. 1). According to Keynes, while on 
the one hand the fall in price level favours the class of rentiers (as creditors), on 
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the other hand it penalises the entrepreneurs (as debtors), but it is on their 
decisions that the levels both of current production and of investment depend.  
  With regard to the former aspect, Keynes observes that “ a fall in prices, 
effects redistribution of real wealth from those who make the decisions which set 
production into motion to those who are inactive once they have lent their money” 
(1923, p. 30).  In the Tract on Monetary Reform, moreover, Keynes makes it quite 
perfectly clear that, as he sees it, the expectation of a fall in the level of prices can 
entail a drastic cut in production: “During the lengthy process of production the 
business world is incurring outgoings in terms of money – paying out in money 
for wages and other expenses of production – in the expectation of recouping this 
outlay by disposing of the product for money at a later date7. That is to say, the 
business world as a whole must always be in a position where it stands to gain by 
a rise of price and to lose by a fall of price….Now it follows from this, not merely 
that the actual occurrence of prices changes profits  some classes and injures 
others…but that a general fear of falling prices may inhibit the productive process 
altogether… For if prices are expected to fall …entrepreneurs will be reluctant to 
embark on lengthy productive processes involving a money outlay long in 
advance of money recoupment- whence unemployment. The fact of falling prices 
injures entrepreneurs; consequently the fear of falling prices causes them to 
protect themselves by curtailing their operations” (1923, pp. 33-34). 
  As for the effects produced by a decline in wages and prices on 
aggregate investment, on the other hand, Keynes makes a distinction  between the 
fall in current wages and the expectation of further reductions in them in the 
future: “If the reduction of money-wages is expected to be a reduction relatively 
to money-wages in the future, the change will be favourable to investment….. If, 
on the other hand, the reduction leads to the expectation, or even to the serious 
possibility, of a further wage-reduction in prospect, it will have precisely the 
opposite effect. For it will diminish the marginal efficiency of capital and will 
lead to the postponement both of investment and of consumption.” (1936, p. 
263)8. Keynes thus shows particular attention to the effects produced by a 
                                                 
7 Thus it is already clear in the Tract that Keynes accepts the M-C-M’ process as underlying a 
monetary economy. As we know, this is a point that goes back to Marx and was to occupy a 
central position in The Monetary Theory of Production of 1933a,b. This aspect will be discuss 
further in section  n. 4. 
           8 This point was discussed further by Oscar Lange (1944) p. 20. 
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cumulative process in expectations of a fall in prices, and thus  to the effects of 
wage and price flexibility in a dynamic context9.  
   However, it is above all when we consider the effect that the deflationary 
process has on the debt burden, in the case of agents who have borrowed money,  
that we find particularly good reason for a substantial critique of Pigou’s “real 
balance effect” and its alleged stabilising role. In this connection Keynes 
observes that “ …the depressing influence on entrepreneurs of their greater 
burden of debt may partly offset any cheerful reactions from the reduction of 
wages. Indeed if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those 
entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency, 
— with severely adverse effects on investment. Moreover the effect of the lower 
price-level on the real burden of the national debt and hence on taxation is likely 
to prove very adverse to business confidence.” (ibid. p. 264).   
  Should the debt burden be such as to produce a state of widespread 
insolvency, then entrepreneurs faced with increasing liabilities may well be 
tempted to sell the assets. This would lead to a fall in the price of the assets10, 
with negative repercussions on the stability of the general financial structure. In 
fact, in “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money Values” of 
193111 Keynes notes how a sharp fall in the value of equitable assets can also 
mean greater financial fragility for the banks since they would see a drastic 
reduction in their “margin of safety”12; in fact he wrote (p. 156): “It is for this 
reason that a decline in money values so severe as that which we are now 
experiencing threatens the solidarity of the whole financial structure. Banks and 
bankers are by nature blind. They have not seen what was coming ….In the 
United States some of them employ so-called “economists” who tell us even 
today that our troubles are due to the fact that the prices of some commodities 
and some services have not yet fallen enough, regardless of what should be the 
obvious fact that their cure, if it could be realised, would be a menace of their 
                                                 
9 See also Keynes (1925). As noted in section 1, this aspect has been closely and further analysed by Patinkin 
(1948). 
10 The fall in the cost price of capital goods has two causes: there exists no ‘perfect’ secondary market for the 
sale of these goods, and at the same time they are firm-specific. 
11 For very similar arguments see the letter of 22 June to Hubert  Henderson, CW XX, p. 555. 
 12 Capital goods often constitute collateral, and thus a guarantee to the creditor against debtor insolvency. 
These aspects have come under the attention of the so-called “debt deflation school”, which we consider in 
section n. 4. 
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institution”. The deterioration in the “state of credit”13 would ensue, again with 
negative impact on investment, income and employment14. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Non-stabilizing flexibility: Kalecki’s contributions 
 
  In his criticism of Pigou, Kalecki (1944) arrives at considerations 
remarkably close to those formulated by Keynes15 in the General Theory and 
various other contributions mentioned above16. In fact, referring to the increase in 
wealth in real terms brought about by deflation in prices, he observes: “…The 
increase in the real value of the stock of money does not mean a rise in the total 
real value of possessions if all the money (cash and deposits) is “backed” by 
credits to persons and firms, i.e. if all the assets of the banking system consist of 
such credits. For in this case, to the gain of money holders there corresponds an 
equal loss of the bank debtors. ....The adjustment required would increase 
catastrophically the real value of debts, and would consequently lead to wholesale 
bankruptcy and a ‘confidence crisis’ ” (1944, p. 132).  
  Kalecki returned to the problem of the rising debt burden consequent 
upon wage and price deflation in chapter V of his Studies in the Theory of  
Businness Cycles (1966)  entitled Money and Real Wages . In fact, analysing the 
indirect effects of a change in the general level of prices and wages on 
employment, Kalecki observes that: “A general reduction of prices increases the 
                                                 
13 Keynes refers to the “confidence” which the financial institutes place in loan applicants. 
14 Thus the deflationary process of wages and prices produces effects of persistence for real magnitudes, in 
part due to the fact that it can open the way to deterioration in the state of credit. Here, too, as in the case of 
the M-C-M’ process, there are distinct echoes of Marx. 
15 Keynes had had the opportunity to read Kalecki’s critical comment on Pigou as early as the first months of 
’44. In a letter of 22 February addressed to Kalecki (Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 567) he expresses his 
agreement with him, while also offering some suggestions: “Looking through your note on Pigou again, the 
following point occurs to me. Is there anything in it? I offer to you, for what it is worth, as a possible addition. 
On Pigou’s assumption, the real rate of interest in Irving Fisher’s sense would be constantly rising. This would 
have two effects: a) people would save more, and not less, as Pigou assumes. b) if the real value of money is 
constantly increasing, there will be a strong pressure to repay debts. Thus, at the limit, it would become 
impossible for the banks to keep the stocks of money constant except in so far as it was backed by gold. Thus, 
in effect, Pigou is assuming two contradictory hypothesis”.  Keynes had also asked for Pigou’s answer to 
Kalecki’s criticisms, but to no avail. 
16 Here we do not deal with the simililarities and/or differences between Keynes and Kalecki on the  principle of 
effective demand  (on this topic see: Davidson, 2000; Lopez, 2002), but only to their analysis concerning 
“Pigou  effect”.  
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burden of indebtedness, since money incomes diminish while the “old” debts do 
not. This causes difficulties in servicing the debts, ending frequently in failures. 
As a result confidence in the solvency of firms is undermined which may lead to 
an increase in the long-term rate of interest even though the short-term rate 
declines ” (1966, p. 49). As for the redistribution of wealth occurring subsequent 
to a fall in prices and wages, Kalecki (1966, p. 49-50, note 2) – juts like Keynes 
(cf. Chapter 1 of the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923)) – sees it having 
unfavourable effects on production and employment. In this respect, Kalecki 
states: “…when prices decline in the same proportion as wages, this will also be 
true of profits. But the money income of rentiers consisting of the interest on 
“old” debts does not change and therefore, their relative share in profits 
increases”. Thus the shift in distribution occurs at the expense of the 
entrepreneurs and to the advantage of the rentiers.  All this adds up to the fact that 
“If the entrepreneurs are “poorer” than the rentiers, this kind of shift will result 
rather in a decrease of total capitalists’ consumption17. In the contrary case the 
result would be an increase. The first pattern applies usually to societies where the 
concentration in industry is not too far advanced; the second to developed 
capitalist economies. But the final outcome is by no means certain even in this 
case, because quite a number of firms are in a precarious financial position, as a 
result of the decline in income  while their “old” debts remain unchanged, and this 
discourages any investment activity on their part.” (ibid. p. 50, note n. 2).   
  We find the fall in aggregate demand ensuing upon a decline in wages 
and prices further reflected in Kalecki’s work if we consider the “principle of 
increasing risk” formulated in 193718. Here, in fact, he argues that the level of 
investment depends negatively on the degree of indebtedness (given by the ratio 
between debt and internal sources of financing). An increase in the debt burden 
brought about by plunging prices would have the effect of reducing the internal 
net-worth19 of the firms, increasing the risk involved in indebtedness (debtor’s 
risk) and leading to a decline in investments and so in income and employment, 
                                                 
17 In fact, in Kalecki’s analysis (1966) “the fluctuations in production and profits depend on the fluctuations in 
capitalists’ consumption and investment” (p. 46)…since the workers spend on consumption goods as much as 
they receive in wages, the remainder of the national income, being the share of capitalists, is just equal to their 
expenditure on consumption and investment goods. Therefore the capitalists as a class determine by their 
expenditure their profits and in consequences the aggregate production.” (p. 44-45) 
18 The principles of increasing borrower and lender risk are keystones to  H. P. Minsky’s  post-Keynesian 
analysis (1975); they will be discussed in the following section. 
          19 Given by the difference between financial assets and liabilities. 
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producing effects in sharp contrast with the results expected according to the 
mainstream approach.  
  The analysis proposed by Keynes and Kalecki regarding the 
destabilising effects brought about by the increase in debt burden contains 
distinct echoes of the theoretical contribution by Irving Fisher on the Great 
Depression of ’29. In his article entitled “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great 
Depressions” (1933), Fisher had in fact traced the phenomenon of persistence in 
income and employment decline precisely to the effect produced by wage and 
price deflation. The chain reaction sweeping through both firms and the banks 
and financial institutions, plunging them into bankruptcy in late 1933, went so far 
as to threaten the stability of the capitalistic economic system at the worldwide 
level, eloquently demonstrating the fallaciousness of the laissez-faire principle. 
  In the light of the considerations presented in this and the previous 
section, it appears fairly evident that, reading anew the contributions Keynes and 
Kalecki, the need is for a radical reappraisal of the role of self-balancing 
mechanism which the mainstream macroeconomic attributes to Pigou’s “real 
balance effect”: in a depressive phase, wage and price flexibility is more likely to 
produce destabilising rather than stabilising effects. 
 
4. Towards a post-keynesian approach 
 
  The critical observations that Keynes and Kalecki had to make on the 
alleged stabilising role performed by wage and price flexibility were subsequently 
taken up and further formulated by various authors working on Keynesian lines, 
thus giving rise to a stimulating new current in research that turns out to be in 
sharp contrast with the mainstream approach. Suffice it here, as illustration of the 
point with a few representative examples, to cite the contributions by Tobin 
(1975, 1980; 1993), Minsky (1975; 1982; 1984)20 and, more recently, Caskey-
Fazzari (1987; 1989; 1992)21. As is well known, in the chapter entitled “Real 
balance effects reconsidered”, Tobin (1980) demonstrated that if the marginal 
propensity to spend of debtors’ (represented mainly by entrepreneurs) is, as one 
                                                 
20 Minsky is often counted among the supporters of the so-called “debt deflation school” which grew up 
mainly in the United States thanks to Fisher’s 1933 contribution.  
21 This listing of significant contributions is by no means exhaustive. On the issue of destabilising flexibilities 
see also: Davidson (1972); Delong-Summers (1986); Hahn-Solow (1986); Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993);  and, 
more recently, Simonazzi-Vianello (2004). 
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may reasonably suppose, greater than that of creditors, then the effect that wage 
and price deflation has on the debt burden (i.e. the “Fisher effect”, or debt 
deflation effect) can predominate and force out Pigou’s real balance effect, with 
destabilising consequences. To this we must add that if the fall in the general 
level of prices should trigger expectations of further falls in them, then the 
resulting increase in the real interest rate can induce a further decline in 
investment, income and employment (Tobin, 1975), and possible states of 
insolvency for the debtors: the creditors, for their part, would experience a 
dramatic loss of confidence22, facing the heavy costs of credit recovery.  
  In this connection Minsky (1975; 1982; 1984) applied the principle of 
increasing risk formulated by Kalecki (1937)23 to demonstrate that the decline in 
internal net-worth brought about by wage and price deflation has the effect of 
increasing not only the “lender’s risk” but also the “borrower’s risk”24, entailing a 
rise in the cost of financing and so a further decline in investment, income and 
employment. As we know, the theory of financial instability formulated by 
Minsky seeks to yoke various aspects of Kalecki’s analysis to the theory of 
Keynes and finds consistency precisely in abandonment of the “Pigou effect” as 
means of automatic adjustment. In fact, remarking critically on the “Neoclassical 
Keynesian Synthesis”,  he observes that (1975, p. 54): “… . Falling wages, prices 
and cash-flows to enterprises will make the burden of debt to potential bank 
borrowers increase over the life of the loan. A decline in wages and prices will 
tend to set off a money-decreasing debt deflation process, which will exacerbate 
the initial deficit of demand of labor – that is wage and price-level flexibility is 
disequilibrating”. Moreover, Minsky goes on to point out, the revolutionary scope 
of Keynes’s thought also extends to the crucial role played by money and credit  
in the process of financing production and investment25.  As Keynes inverted the 
causal relation between savings and investments this means that investment 
decisions are not financed by savings but with the money created by banks: the 
diffusion of bank money makes trasparent the keynesian theory’s casual 
                                                 
           22 Cf. Keynes  (1931). 
23 Cf. section 3. 
24 Cf. Minsky, 1975 p. 145. We also find explicit references to the question of “lender’s risk” and “borrower’s 
risk” in Keynes’s General Theory (cf. 1936, trad. it. p.284) . 
25 These aspects were central both in The monetary theory of production (1933a) and in The distinction 
between a co-operative economy and an entrepreneur economy (1933b). Unfortunately they  were overlooked 
in The General Theory where particular emphasis is put on the concept of money demand as store of wealth but 
not as means of payment (see Minsky, 1975; Palley 2002 and  Bertocco, 2005). The more recent monetary 
circuit approach (Graziani, 1996) has emphasized this point of  Keynes’s analysis. 
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relationship between investments and savings (cf. Rochon, 1999; Bertocco, 2005). 
Debt and credit positions are therefore a consequence of the spreading of a fiat 
money made up by bank money.  
In virtue of the fact that a monetary capitalistic economy moves along the lines of 
the M-C-M’ process (with M’>M), it follows that the change in the debt burden 
brought about by the variation in the level of prices has fundamental 
repercussions on the stability of the economic system. In fact, as soon as fiat 
money is taken into account, income fluctuations caused  by a lack of effective 
demand, become more frequent. Minsky (1982) argued that the latter can be 
properly described as a monetary phenomenon. In fact, the alternation of phases 
of boom and bust is due to changes in banks’ criteria in appraising firms’ 
investment project. 
  The analysis proposed by Tobin and Minsky has in turn given rise to 
particularly relevant results from the macroeconomic point of view (cf. Caskey-
Fazzari, 1987; 1989; 1992), although they have yet to find wider circulation. 
They have, in fact, led to a substantial modification of the traditional AD-AS 
model (cf. sec. 1), above all with respect to aggregate demand. Indeed, should the 
“Fisher effect” successfully oust the “Pigou effect”, then the AD curve would no 
longer prove negative in relation to prices, with the consequence that, were the 
economy to be in a depressive phase, then wage and price deflation could cause a 
further decline in income and employment26, with destabilising effects. Thus, in 
accordance with the thesis of  Keynes and Kalecki, and in contrast with the 
mainstream approach, wage and price flexibility is seen to be totally unequipped 
to ensure that full employment be reached. 
 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
 
  The mainstream macroeconomic approach has it that, thanks to the 
action of Pigou’s “real balance effect”,  price flexibility for goods and factors 
represents the endogenous mechanism by means of which the economic system 
can achieve self-balancing. In this paper, by contrast, drawing upon various 
                                                 
            26 On this question see: Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993 e D’Orlando- Nisticò, 1998. 
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considerations contained in contributions by Keynes and Kalecki, and taking into 
account subsequent the developments offered by the literature, we have sought to 
demonstrate that the alleged role of stabilisation played by the “Pigou effect”  
calls for radical reappraisal.  
  The first point of departure was Keynes himself (1923; 1936 ch. 19) as 
he noted that a falling money wages and price levels will lead to redistributions of 
income firstly from wage-earners to non-wage earners, the net effect of which 
would be the reduction in the economy-wide marginal propensity to consume. 
The income redistribution effect was taken up by Kalecki: if profit-earners have a 
lower propensity to consume than wage-earners then the average marginal 
propensity to consume in the economy declines and thus aggregate demand 
decline. Thus, far from being stabilizing the reduction in money wages in a 
situation of unemployment can lead to reductions in aggregate demand and thus 
more unemployment. 
The second point was already expressed, once more, by Keynes (1923; 
1931), by Irving Fisher (1933) and by Kalecki (1944) in a comment on Pigou, it 
is known as the “debt deflation effect”: as financing contracts are established in 
nominal terms, then the redistribution of wealth between debtors and creditors 
coming about subsequent to wage and price deflation can bring about a further 
decline in income and employment. Moreover, if the decline in prices is such as 
to generate expectations of yet more declines, then the resulting rise in the real 
interest rate will, once again, trigger destabilising effects. As we have tried to 
show these aspects was given a central role to elaborate an alternative approach 
particularly by Minsky (1975), Tobin (1980) and Caskey and Fazzari (1987). 
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Abstract: New and old mainstream macroeconomics argues that price flexibility stabilizes the economy. 
After a decline in aggregate demand, the more rapidly prices fall, the faster output returns to its full 
employment level. The theoretical basis for this result is the well known  “Pigou effect”: as prices fall the 
public’s real outside money balances increase and consumption rises. However both Keynes and Kalecki 
rejected the thesis that price flexibility, in a demand-induced recession, can be stabilizing. In fact, in the 
chapter titled “The consequences to Society of Changes in the Value of Money” (Tract on Monetary 
Reform, 1923), in one set of writings which took place in 1931-33 and in the General Theory (1936: Ch. 
XIX) Keynes questioned the viability of flexible wages and prices to restore full employment. On the other 
hand, in a comment on Pigou, Kalecki (1944) argued that falling prices will not necessarily stimulate an 
increase in aggregate demand when firms and households have extensive debt commitments. This paper 
seeks to contrast Keynes’s and Kalecki’s ideas with the mainstream and discuss an alternative approach in 
the spirit of the post-Keynesian’s “debt deflation school”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
